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SECURITY DEVICES
Michael H. Rubin*
SURETYSHIP
Bonura v. Christiana Brothers Poultry Co. of Gretna, Inc.
gives judicial sanction to a concept practitioners have long
held, that a "continuing guarantee" is an enforceable contract
of suretyship for an unlimited duration. The Bonura court also
held that if the term of a suretyship agreement is co-extensive
with the term of the principal obligation, the contract of sure-
tyship does not prescribe until the principal obligation pre-
scribes.
Suretyship is an accessory obligation.' Because a surety
undertakes personal liability, suretyship is not presumed;' the
contract of suretyship must be in writing.4 This does not mean,
however, that the principal obligation which the suretyship
secures must also be written. As long as a principal obligation
exists, the written contract of suretyship is valid. Therefore, as
was held in Parish of East Baton Rouge v. Travelers Insurance
Co.5 and Quickick, Inc. v. Quickick International,' parol evi-
dence is admissible to prove the principal obligation that the
suretyship secures.'
Louisiana courts have long distinguished between
"gratuitous" and "compensated" sureties. The general rule is
that a gratuitous surety is entitled to a much narrower inter-
pretation of the suretyship contract than a compensated
* Visiting Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
Bar.
1. 336 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
2. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3035.
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3039.
4. Civil Code article 2278 provides: "Parol evidence shall not be received: ...
(3) To prove any promise to pay the debt ofa third person."
5. 342 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 5 (La. 1977).
6. 341 So. 2d 1313 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 343 So. 2d 1076 (La.
1977).
7. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3038: "A man may be surety without the order or even
the knowledge of the person for whom he becomes surety." See also Queen's Ins. Co.
v. Bloomenstiel, 184 La. 1070, 168 So. 302 (1936).
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surety.8 Bonding companies on jobs falling within the scope of
the Public and Private Works Acts' and those bonding compa-
nies that issue performance bonds cannot rely upon a stricti
juris reading of their contracts to protect them in all cases.
Nevertheless, the contract of a compensated surety must be
enforced if violations of the contract by the creditor operate to
the detriment of the surety. In Airtrol Engineering Co., Inc. v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ,o the court held that a
premature payment by a contractor to a sub-contractor dis-
charges the sub-contractor's surety; to hold otherwise would be
to encourage the disbursement of funds prior to the perform-
ance of the work.
PLEDGE
Out of an abundance of caution, and perhaps in reliance
on concepts set forth in dicta in early cases but long since
outmoded by the passage of legislation," many practitioners
routinely draft documents in the form of a "pledge and assign-
ment." Naquin v. American Bank of Luling2 reiterates the rule
set down in Scott v. Corkern;3 the concept of pledge is anti-
thetical to that of assignment." As an assignment is a transfer
of title, if a debtor truly "assigns" property to his creditor, this
8. Compare Texas Co. v. Couvillon, 148 So. 295 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933), with
Bickham v. Womack, 181 La. 837, 160 So. 431 (1935).
9. LA. R.S. 9:4801-55 (Supp. 1976) and LA. R.S. 38:2241-48 (Supp. 1978), respec-
tively.
10. 345 So. 2d 1271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
11. Compare Caffin v. Kirwan, 7 La. Ann. 221 (1852), with LA. R.S. 9:4321
(1950).
12. 347 So. 2d 332 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
13. 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956).
14. The only possible exception to this rule is the Assignment of Accounts Re-
ceivable Act, LA. R.S. 9:3101-10 (Supp. 1964). The Act itself defines "assignment" as
including "any sale, pledge, conveyance or transfer of an account, or of any right, title
or interest therein." LA. R.S. 9:3101(3) (Supp. 1964) (emphasis added). The common
use of assignment of accounts, however, is to secure obligations; in other words, it is
used as a pledge rather than as a true assignment. Any problems that may arise
concerning the validity of the "assignment" (pledge) of accounts receivable without
actual dispossession of the pledgor in control of the funds (cf. Casey v. Cavaroc, 96
U.S. 467 (1877)) have been resolved in favor of the validity of the pledge by the
addition of Revised Statutes 9:4324. LA. R.S. 9:4324 (Supp. 1978), added by 1978 La.
Acts, No. 703, § 1.
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may result in the extinction of the debt through a dation en
paiement.'5 On the other hand, if the "assignment" is intended
only to secure the payment of an obligation, it is a mere secu-
rity device. In the case of movable property, the security device
would be a pledge. The court in Naquin put substance over
form in holding that a written "assignment" of a bank account
as security for a loan constituted a valid pledge rather than a
true assignment."
A pledge of negotiable instruments need not be in writing;
mere delivery of the instrument pledged completes the pledge
both as between the parties and as to third parties. 7 Like sure-
tyship, a pledge is an accessory obligation; the principal obliga-
tion which the pledge supports need not be in writing.' 8 There-
fore, the issue to be determined, both as between the debtor
and the creditor and as to third parties, is precisely what obli-
gation is secured by the pledge of a negotiable instrument when
there is no contemporaneous written evidence at the time of the
pledge. Lepow v. Walker Land Co., Inc. '5 and Durham v. First
Guaranty Bank of Hammond" reaffirm the rule that the extent
of the principal obligation secured by the pledge is determined
by the subjective intent of the parties at the time the pledge
was entered into. In Durham a note paraphed for identification
with an act of collateral mortgage was pledged without a writ-
ten act of pledge. There was at that time a pre-existing debt
to the creditor. Some months after the pledge, a second loan
was obtained from the same creditor. The court held that the
collateral mortgage package did not secure the debt incurred
prior to the pledge because there was no proof that, at the time
of the pledge, the parties intended to secure pre-existing obli-
gations. 2' In Lepow a written act pledged seventy-nine negotia-
15. LA. CIr. CODE arts. 2655-59. See Pomez v. Camors & Co., 36 La. Ann. 464
(1884).
16. Civil Code article 3158 requires that, with certain exceptions, there must be
an act of pledge in order to affect third parties.
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3158.
18. Sambola v. Fandison, 178 So. 276 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938).
19. 352 So. 2d 314 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
20. 331 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 431 (La. 1976).
21. While the result of the Durham case is perhaps correct, considering the
inability of the lender to produce sufficient proof to show intent at the time of the
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ble notes to secure a $296,000 debt. The creditor sought to
extend the pledge not only to the $296,000 debt but also to
other obligations. The Lepow court acknowledged that negotia-
ble instruments could be pledged without a written act but
ruled that the creditor had not met its burden of proving that
the pledge secured anything other than a specific debt. The
results of Durham and Lepow indicate that, although a pledge
of negotiable instruments need not be in writing, it is always
advisable to obtain a contemporaneous written act of pledge to
prove what debts are to be secured.
Avoyelles Trust & Savings Bank v. Liliedahl" held that
while corporate stock of a close corporation may be pledged to
secure a debt of a shareholder, the creditor may not proceed to
a judicial sale of the pledged stock if it bears a restriction
requiring that the corporation and other shareholders be given
a right of first refusal prior to any sale. Acknowledging that the
issue was res nova in Louisiana, the Third Circuit found per-
suasive the holding of New York and Florida courts that such
pledge, there is unfortunate dictum in the case. The court set forth, as one of its
rationales, that the pre-existing debt was not "connected" by any writing to the collat-
eral mortgage package. Insofar as the court was implying that there must be a written
connection between a handnote and a collateral mortgage package, the court was
incorrect. There is no requirement that there even be a "handnote" in a collateral
mortgage situation. There are no statutory or jurisprudential rules mandating the
existence of the handnote. A collateral mortgage package is merely the pledge of a
negotiable instrument to secure a debt. The principal obligation need not be in writing.
The pledged note, the so-called "ne varietur" note, is in turn secured by a mortgage.
But the fact that the mortgage secures a "ne varietur" note alters neither the basic
structure of the arrangement nor the legal rights of the parties. A collateral mortgage
package is first and foremost a pledge of a negotiable instrument, the "ne varietur"
note. The principal obligation secured by a pledge need not be in writing. Steeg v.
Codifer, 157 La. 298, 102 So. 407 (1924); Sambola v. Fandison, 178 So. 276 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1938). In fact, there have been several cases that have enforced the validity
of a collateral mortgage package even though no handnote existed. See, e.g., New
Orleans Silversmiths, Inc. v. Toups, 261 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied,
263 So. 2d 47 (La. 1972); Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc., 165 So. 2d 855 (La. App.
4th Cir.), cert. denied, 246 La. 867, 167 So. 2d 677 (1964). Furthermore, a negotiable
instrument may be pledged by mere delivery-no written act is required. LA. Civ. CODE
art. 3158. Therefore, it is clear that as no writing is required for either the principal
obligation or the pledge, there is no requirement of written "connexity" between the
principal obligation and the pledged "ne varietur" note secured by a collateral mort-
gage. A written pledge agreement merely aids in the proof of both the possibly unwrit-
ten principal obligation and the date of the pledge.
22. 348 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1228 (La. 1977).
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a stock restriction bars judicial sales prior to an offer to sell to
the corporation. The case was admittedly a close one. "First
right of refusal" stock restrictions are authorized by Revised
Statutes 12:57(F). The corporation also could have chosen to
restrict the ability of shareholders to pledge the stock; however,
it chose not to do so. On the other hand, had the stock con-
tained a restriction on pledge, the creditor obviously would not
have taken it as security without obtaining a waiver of the
restriction from the corporation. Without a restriction on
pledge of the stock, neither the owner nor the creditor had to
notify the corporation of the act of pledge.? If the corporation
need not be notified of the pledge, it seems inconsistent to
allow the corporation to hinder the enforcement of the pledge
by enjoining the judicial sale.
The prohibition of a judicial sale can restrict trade and
credit. 24 Considering that the issue was res nova, the court
could have taken judicial notice of the fact that, prior to the
court's decision, many creditors were of the opinion that a
stock restriction on resale applied only to voluntary transfers,
an opinion supported by decisions in Iowa, Kentucky, Okla-
homa, and Pennsylvania.? Judge Watson's dissent appears to
be the sounder view. The resale restriction should not apply to
non-voluntary transfers such as judicial sales, but even if it
23. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3158, which reads:
When a debtor wishes to pledge. . . stocks . . . he shall deliver to the creditor
the . . . stocks . . . so pledged, and such pledge so made . . . shall without
further formalities be valid as well against third persons as against the pledgor
thereof, if made in good faith . . . it being understood that no notification is
required in the case of the pledge of certificates of corporation stock.
24. The court noted that the corporation was not required to have a pledge
restriction on the stock certificate to prevent third parties from purchasing the stock
through a judicial sale. The court stated:
It can be argued that the corporation could have prevented the present
situation by forbidding stockholders the right to pledge their shares. However,
since restrictions of trade are not favored in law, it would perhaps be wise not
to hold the corporation to such a duty.
The bank could also have foreseen such a situation when it accepted the
pledge, and it was clearly warned of the prohibition by the warning on the
certificates.
348 So. 2d at 156.
25. These decisions were cited by the Liliedahl court, but the court declined to
follow this line of jurisprudence.
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should, the corporation can be protected by requiring that it
receive notice of the sale. 21 At the judicial sale the corporation
could bid the stock in at the same price as any other buyer.
The holding in Liliedahl may lead to further abuses. Upon
seizure and sale, could a corporation enforce a restriction that
allows it to buy the stock back at book value or at some other
price lower than was offered by a bona fide third-party
purchaser? As a result of Liliedahl, creditors will have to scruti-
nize closely all stock given as security and obtain a waiver from
the corporation of any "first right of refusal" restrictions.
MORTGAGES
Article 3305 of the Civil Code states that conventional
mortgages can be contracted by an act under private signature.
There is an apparent conflict between articles 3305 and 3348;27
the latter article seems to require a notarial act or a private act
duly acknowledged. Two early cases held that the provisions of
article 3348 are directed to the clerk of court and do not refer
to the effect on third parties of the recordation of a mortgage. 
2
American Bank & Trust Co. in Monroe v. Carson Homes2 1 fol-
lows the rule of these older cases. A timely recorded mortgage
under private signature affects third persons; the mortgage
need not be in authentic form nor by a private act duly ac-
knowledged.
Bonner v. B-W Utilities, Inc.,30 a federal district court
opinion, is perhaps the most important case during the past
year in the area of security devices and civil procedure. Bonner
held that procedural due process requires the holder of a con-
ventional mortage to give notice of seizure in executory pro-
ceedings to a third party possessor. The right to receive notice
26. See Bonner v. B-W Utilities, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D. La. 1978).
27. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3348 reads in part:
If the instrument on which the mortgage or privilege is based be an authentic
act, a copy thereof shall be recorded; if it be an act under private signature,
promissory note or other written instrument, it must be proved up and recorded
in the manner required for acts under private signature.
28. Allen, West and Bush v. Whetstone, 35 La. Ann. 846 (1883); Stallcup v.
Pyron, 33 La. Ann. 1249 (1881).
29. 344 So. 2d 456 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 So. 2d 221 (La. 1977).
30. 452 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D. La. 1978).
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had been accorded previously only to third party possessors of
property subject to a judicial or legal mortgage." While the
court stopped short of holding that the notice of seizure must
be served by the sheriff, the cautious practitioner will now not
only run a title check on property prior to foreclosure by execu-
tory process, but will also serve a notice of seizure on all those
who have purchased the property subject to the mortgage or
who have assumed the mortgage. The holding in Bonner is
relatively narrow, but it implicitly raises the issue of whether
notice of seizure must be served upon "simple sureties" or sure-
ties bound "in solido" with the debtor although the sureties do
not own an interest in the property being seized. Because the
court relied primarily upon the holdings of United States Su-
preme Court cases that prohibit pre-judgment seizures of prop-
erty,3 a strong contention can be made that those without a
possessory or ownership interest in the property need not be
given notice of executory proceedings."
COLLATERAL MORTGAGES
The ranking of a collateral mortgage depends not only
upon the date of its recordation but also upon the date of
pledge of the note paraphed "ne varietur" for identification
with the act of collateral mortgage." Richey v. Venture Oil and
Gas Corp. 3 delineates the procedure by which a creditor se-
cured by the pledge of a collateral mortgage package can trans-
fer his rank to others and holds that if a new creditor has the
31. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 3742.
32. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
33. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Breaux, 293 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 294 So. 2d 548 (La. 1974).
34. New Orleans Silversmiths, Inc. v. Toups, 261 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 47 (La. 1972); Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc., 165 So. 2d 855
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 167 So. 2d 677 (La. 1964). For detailed expositions
concerning collateral mortgages, see Nathan and Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage,
33 LA. L. Rv. 497 (1973); Nathan and Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage: A Reassess-
ment and Postscript, 36 LA. L. Rlv. 973 (1976); Vetter, The Validity and Ranking of
Future Advance Mortgages in Louisiana, 21 Loy. L. Rav. 141 (1975).
35. 346 So. 2d 875 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
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handnotes assigned to him, he will not lose the rank that his
transferor had held. 36
RECORDATION
Just because a security device is not recorded on the face
of the public records does not mean that third parties are unaf-
fected.37 For example, certain privileges arising upon the death
of a debtor need not be recorded. 3
Likewise, a fraudulent cancellation of a mortgage will not
deprive a creditor of his ranking as against third parties.39 On
the other hand, recording a document that need not be re-
corded does not create any additional rights. Wayside Develop-
ment Co. v. Post" held that recording a "service contract" in
the mortgage records did not give the creditor any secured right
to the immovable property. The court repeated the well-known
rule that mortgages and privileges are stricti juris; parties can-
not create security rights on immovable property apart from
those security devices expressly authorized by statute.
JUDICIAL MORTGAGES
Consolidation Loans, Inc. v. Guerciol' dealt with whether
a judgment had prescribed when a suit to revive the judgment
36. The handnotes are the principal obligation secured by the pledge of the "ne
varietur" note; the "ne varietur" note, in turn, is secured by the collateral mortgage.
A transfer of the handnote transfers the accessory obligation, the "ne varietur" note.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 2645. The transfer of the "ne varietur" note, in turn, carries with it
the collateral mortgage. An attempted "assignment" of the "ne varietur" note, how-
ever, without the assignment of the principal obligation (the handnote), constitutes
either a breach of the pledge by the assignor or a "reissuance," giving the transferee a
new, lower rank than that held by the assignor. Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc., 165
So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 167 So. 2d 677 (La. 1964).
37. See Redmann, The Louisiana Law of Recordation: Some Principles and
Some Problems, 39 Tu. L. REy. 491 (1965).
38. Privileges arising at death, such as for funeral charges (see LA. CiV. CODE arts.
3192-94) and for last illness (see LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3199-3204), need not be recorded
and yet affect the immovable property of the decedent. LA. CONST. of 1921 art. XIX,
§ 19 was continued in LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 16(A)(15).
39. This rule was reiterated in two cases decided last year. Gulf South Bank and
Trust Co. v. Demarest, 354 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Bank v. Bishop, 353
So. 2d 1109 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 So. 2d 549 (La. 1978).
40. 338 So. 2d 1173 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
41. 356 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
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was brought within ten years after the court of appeal's affir-
mation of the trial court's judgment, but more than ten years
after the trial court's judgment had been signed. The court
ruled that the suit to revive the judgment was untimely, hold-
ing that a "rendition" of a judgment within the meaning of
article 3547 of the Civil Code 2 occurs solely upon the signing
of the judgment by the trial court; the "mere" affirmation by
an appellate court (as opposed to a decree amending or revers-
ing the trial court) is not the type of "judgment" to which the
article refers.
By literally applying earlier jurisprudence and by refusing
to recognize the distinction between trial court and appellate
court judgments created by the 1960 amendments to article
3547,43 the court missed an opportunity to clarify a murky area
of Louisiana law. While the validity of a judicial mortgage was
not directly before the court, perhaps the opinion might have
been different if the original appellate court judgment (affirm-
ing the trial court) had been recorded." Revised Statutes
13:4434-35 providethat the recordation of an appellate court
decree in the mortgage records "shall operate as a judicial
mortgage." These statutes, when read in conjunction with arti-
cle 3547 of the Civil Code, would lead one to believe that an
appellate court decree affirming a trial court's ruling is just as
much a "rendition" of a "judgment" as a reversal or amend-
ment of the lower court's opinion. 5
The problem with the result of Guercio originates in two
42. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3547, as amended by 1960 La. Acts, No. 30, § 1, provides
in part: "A money judgment rendered by a court of this state is prescribed by the lapse
of ten years from its signing, if rendered by a trial court, or from its rendition if
rendered by an appellate court."
43. Prior to 1960 La. Acts, No. 30, § 1, Civil Code article 3547 made no distinc-
tion between judgments of trial and appellate courts; it spoke only of "all judgments
for money." The 1960 amendments seem to indicate that any appellate court decree
for a money judgment starts the running of prescription; no distinction is made be-
tween decrees affirming trial court judgments and those amending or reversing the trial
court.
44. The instant case did not state whether the earlier appellate opinion, 200 So.
2d 717 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), had been recorded.
45. See also Mossler Acceptance Corp. v. Naquin, 30 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1947).
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early cases holding that neither suspensive" nor devolutive47
appeals interrupt prescription of the trial court's "rendition of
judgment." As one court has noted, this leads to the possibil-
ity of the "anomalous consequence of a judgment becoming
extinguished by prescription before a final determination of the
rights of the litigating parties has been reached in the appellate
court and the whole subject matter vanishing into thin air and
leaving not a trace behind."4 Because a plaintiff is prevented
from executing on the judgment of a trial court if a suspensive
appeal has been taken,'" there is also the unsettled question of
whether judicial mortgages can be validly recorded before the
delays run for the suspensive appeal.8" If a case is appealed to
the United States Supreme Court, a delay of more than ten
years from the signing of the judgment by the trial court to a
final decision by the nation's highest court would not be-incon-
ceivable. As a matter of policy, it would appear more equitable
that a successful plaintiff should be permitted to "revive" a
judgment up to ten years after the rights of the litigating par-
ties finally have been decided.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
Two of the numerous problems created by the Chattel
Mortgage Statute2 involve the degree of detail required in the
description of the mortgaged property and the place where the
chattel mortgage must be recorded. Both issues arose in the
case of Young v. Squeeze Tools, Inc.5 The defendant granted
46. Arrowsmith v. Durell, 21 La. Ann. 295 (1869).
47. Walker v. Towne, 23 La. Ann. 176 (1871).
48. These two cases were decided on the basis of a provision originating with 1853
La. Acts, No. 274, which became the basis for article 3547 in the 1870 Civil Code, There
had been no corresponding provisions in the 1825 Code or the Digest of 1808; likewise,
there was no corresponding article in the Code Napoleon. Cf. 1972 COMPUED EDTION
OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA art. 3547 (J. Dainow ed.). Article 3547 was last
amended by 1960 La. Acts, No. 39, § 1.
49. Arrowsmith v. Durell, 21 La. Ann. 295-96 (1869).
50. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2252.
51. See Comment, Judicial Mortgage Rights: Recordation of Non-Executory
Judgments, 35 LA. L. REv. 892 (1975).
52. LA. R.S. 9:5351-66 (Supp. 1978).
53. 350 So. 2d 967 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 39
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a chattel mortgage on a portable drilling rig, the only one it
owned, but did not include the rig's serial number in the act
of chattel mortgage. The chattel mortgage indicated that the
rig was to be located in Iberia Parish "when not in use." The
court found that the description was adequate to affect third
parties and that once the chattel mortgage was recorded in
Iberia Parish it was effective throughout the state.
This case is one more example of how the Chattel Mort-
gage Statute, complex and convoluted to begin with, has had
another layer of judicial gloss added to its tarnished facade.
Revised Statutes 9:5352 states, in connection with the descrip-
tion which must be given in an act of chattel mortgage of a
specific item, that "a full description of the property to be
mortgaged shall be set forth so that it may be identified and
its location shall be stated."'" The court ruled that because the
chattel mortgage stated that the rig was to be located in Iberia
Parish "when not in use," this was a sufficient description of
the location. The court also decreed that, because it was the
only rig owned by the defendant, a listing of the serial number
was not required. The result of Young creates further "secret
liens" to benefit chattel mortgagees in contravention of the
general rule that mortgages and privileges are stricti juris.
The thrust of any inquiry about a mortgage or privilege
should begin with the premise set forth in article 3183 of the
Civil Code that, unless there exists a "lawful cause" of prefer-
ence, the creditor is unsecured." A line of decisions under the
Chattel Mortgage Statute appears to indicate that if the loca-
tion 6f the movable property is stated in the mortgage, then a
lesser description of the item is permissible than would be the
case had no location been given. These cases also appear to
require a more detailed description of items subject to a chattel
mortgage for a commercial (as opposed to a consumer) loan.56
54. LA. R.S. 9:5352 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
55. Civil Code article 3183 states: "The property of the debtor is the common
pledge of his creditors, and the proceeds of its sale must be distributed among them
ratably, unless there exist among the creditors some lawful causes of preference."
56. Compare Remington Rand, Inc. v. Profits Island Gravel Co., Inc., 150 So. 76
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1933), with All State Credit Plan Houma, Inc. v. Fournier, 175 So.
2d 707 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), and In re Nero, 501 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1974).
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There is nothing in the text of the statute to support the dis-
tinction these cases create; the statute mandates that the loca-
tion "shall be stated."
It was obvious that the parties in Young did not intend
that the rig remain in Iberia Parish; the chattel mortgage
stated that the rig was there only when not in use. The chattel
mortgage would be valuable to the mortgagee only if the rig
were kept productive and not allowed to deteriorate. Revised
Statutes 9:5353 states that the mortgage must be recorded
"where the mortgaged property is to be located according to the
terms of the mortgage instrument . . ... - It seems unfair to
allow the parties to devise a mortgage, give as the location of
the property a place where it will not be used, record the mort-
gage in such a parish, and then obtain an effective state-wide
chattel mortgage, the existence of which is not known to other
creditors in the parishes where the property is actually to be
located when in productive use. The purpose of the state-wide
effect of the chattel mortgage should be to protect the mortga-
gee in case the mortgagor removes the property unexpectedly
from the parish. 8 The Chattel Mortgage Statute should not be
used as a shield behind which the chattel mortgagee may assert
his rights against other creditors in good faith when the chattel
mortgagee can easily protect his rights by recording the chattel
mortgage in other parishes.
Public policy would appear to require that the serial num-
ber of the rig should have been given. Granted, the rig was the
only one owned by the defendant; nevertheless, Young was
unlike those cases in which the mortgaged property was the
only item of its kind on the premises of the debtor and was to
remain on those premises."' In the instant case it was apparent
that the rig was to be put to use in various areas of the state.
Without a serial number or a more particularized description,
there was no way for a third party to know whether a particular
portable drilling rig off the defendant's premises was in fact
57. LA. R.S. 9:5353 (Supp. 1978).
58. See, e.g., Mossier Acceptance Corp. v. Naquin, 30 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1947).
59. See, e.g., Abbott v. Temple, 73 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); Remington
Rand, Inc. v. Profits Island Gravel Co., Inc., 150 So. 76 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
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subject to a chattel mortgage, even if the third party creditor
suspected the existence of the chattel mortgage. The descrip-
tion given in Young does not appear adequate to put third
parties on notice given the fact that the drilling rig was not to
remain on the defendant's premises and, in this case, was in
fact seized by a third party creditor in a different parish.
A sounder approach would be for a court to ask whether
the creditor did all that was reasonably possible to put third
parties on notice of the existence of the chattel mortgage on the
particular item; if not, third parties should not be affected.
Perhaps the crux of the problem is Louisiana's antiquated pub-
lic records doctrine that treats each parish as a separate entity.
With the use of computers, it is feasible to create a central
repository for all recordation data, a repository whose records
would be available throughout the state by the use of computer
terminals located in each parish.
EXEMPTIONS FROM SEIZURE
The Vehicle Certificate of Title Laws expressly allows a
chattel mortgage to be placed on a mobile home; if the mobile
home is later immobilized, the chattel mortgage can be con-
verted to a mortgage on immovable property." Ellis v. Dillon2
held that even if the provisions of the VCTL have not been
followed in "immobilizing" a mobile home, whether a mobile
home has become an immovable so as to qualify for a home-
stead exemption involves a factual determination. The court
ruled that the owner of the mobile home was entitled to a
homestead exemption because, in fact, the mobile home had
been transformed into an immovable by nature. 3 In Ellis the
chattel mortgagee may not have obtained a waiver of the home-
stead exemption because he may have been under the impres-
sion, at the time the chattel mortgage was executed, that the
mobile home would not qualify for a homestead exemption.
60. LA. R.S. 3:701-34 (Supp. 1978).
61. LA. R.S. 32:710(N) (Supp. 1978).
62. 345 So. 2d 1241 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1977).
63. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 464. Book two, title I, of the Civil Code, "Of Things," has
been amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728, § 1.
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The Fourth Circuit faced the problem of whether a chattel
mortgage implicitly waives any other exemptions from seizure
and sale and held, in Aetna Finance Co. v. Antoine,"1 that when
the debtor executed a chattel mortgage on household furniture,
he implicitly waived the exemptions from seizure given in Re-
vised Statutes 13:3881.25 There is dictum in the case, however,
which strongly suggests that the creditor must expressly ex-
plain to the debtor that he is waiving exemptions from seizure
and sale for the mortgaged items. Judge Lemmon's concurring
opinion appears to be a preferable point of view. As Judge
Lemmon noted, an affirmative requirement that the creditor
explain to the debtor that the mortgage will waive exemptions
from seizure and sale "would invite a swearing match over the
validity of the waiver whenever statutorily exempt chattels are
seized. I would limit such contests to those cases in which there
are allegations of fraud, misrepresentation or other vices of
consent.""
ArrORNEYS' PRIVILEGES
Revised Statutes 9:5001 provides a "special privilege" to
attorneys "for the amount of their professional fees on all judg-
ments obtained by them, and on the property recovered
thereby, either as plaintiff or defendant, to take rank as a first
privilege thereon." 7 Livaccari v. Demarest18 held that the priv-
ilege under section 5001 and the privilege for law charges under
article 3191 of the Civil Code do not extend to services per-
formed prior to filing suit. Therefore, the clerk of court was
ordered to erase a purported "attorneys' privilege" recorded by
a lawyer who had performed work on a succession but who
apparently had not filed the succession proceedings.
The use of the term "rank" in section 5001 appears to refer
to ranking as to third parties; whether there is a privilege as
between an attorney and his client on funds held by the attor-
64. 343 So. 2d 1195 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
65. LA. R.S. 13:3881 (Supp. 1978), a8 amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 563, § 1.
66. 343 So. 2d at 1199 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
67. LA. R.S. 9:5001 (1950).
68. 352 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 211 (La.
1978).
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ney is a different matter. The First Circuit" found that Louis-
iana has both a "charging lien" and a "retaining lien"70 under
section 5001 and articles 3022 and 3023 of the Civil Code. The
court ruled that the attorney for the losing party in a lawsuit
had a right to retain funds given "in trust" by his client as
against a garnishment by an unsecured creditor. The case in-
volved only a dispute between an unsecured creditor and the
attorney for the losing party; it should not be seen as authority
for an attorney to retain property as against a secured third
party. 71
REPAIRMAN'S PRIVILEGE
Revised Statutes 9:4501 grants a repairman of automobiles
a privilege that is effective for a period of ninety days from the
"last day on which the repairs were made, or parts made or
furnished, or the labor performed."7 In Van-Trow Olds Cadil-
lac, Inc. v. Kahn73 the court held that the. privilege is lost if
asserted more than ninety days after the labor was performed
or parts furnished. 7' The court did not deal with whether the
ninety-day period is one of "peremption" or prescription. If
peremption, it would not matter whether the automobile was
in the hands of the repairman for the ninety-day period or not;
the privilege would be lost if not asserted within ninety days.
On the other hand, if the period is one of liberative prescrip-
tion, then arguably possession by the repairman interrupts pre-
scription.
69. Board of Trustees of the East Baton Rouge Mortgage Fin. Auth. v. All Tax-
payers, 361 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
70. The use of the terms "charging lien" and "retaining lien" derive from com-
mon law and have no special meaning in civil law; the use of common law terminology
may hinder rather than aid analysis of the exact nature of the Louisiana security device
involved.
71. The attorney for the losing party would not have a privilege under LA. R.S.
9:5001 (1950) because no "judgment" would have been obtained in favor of the client.
Articles 3022 and 3023 of the Civil Code do not create a privilege for the attorney as to
secured third parties.
72. LA. R.S. 9:4501 (Supp. 1977).
73. 345 So. 2d 991 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
74. The court also held that floormats are not "parts" within the meaning of the
statute creating the repairman's privilege.
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LESSOR'S PRIVILEGE
Acadiana Bank v. Foreman5 involved a ranking contest
between a lessor's privilege and a collateral chattel mortgage.
Beginning with the premises that a collateral chattel mortgage
ranks from the date of the pledge of the "ne varietur" note and
that the earliest time a lessor's privilege can affect movables
"is that time when the lease is in effect and the movables are
on the premises,"" the court held that a collateral chattel
mortgage outranks a lessor's privilege when the "ne varietur"
note is pledged prior to the time the lease is to take effect even
though the lease is recorded before the pledge of the note. The
court did not find that the recorded written lease was a recon-
duction of the previous oral lease between the parties; had it
been a reconduction, the lessor would have won.
VENDOR'S PRIVILEGES
In Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Hoggins77 a repairman
claimed a vendor's privilege for "component parts" installed in
a car. The court held that once parts are installed in an auto-
mobile and become an integral part of it; the vendor's privilege
of the individual parts is lost and the repairman is relegated
to his privilege7" against the car as a whole. The court also
found, under the terms of the statute, that a prior chattel mort-
gage on the car outranked the repairman's privilege even
though the parts were put in after the chattel mortgage was
recorded.7
City Bank and Trust Co. v. Caneco Construction, Inc.80
interpreted article 3249(1) of the Civil Code as providing a
privilege to vendors of immovable property only if the act of
sale is on its face a credit sale.8
75. 352 So. 2d 674 (La. 1977).
76. Id. at 678.
77. 347 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
78. LA. R.S. 9:4501 (Supp. 1977).
79. Prior to the foreclosure sale by the chattel mortgagee, the repairman could
have moved for a separate appraisal under the provisions of article 1092 of the Code
of Civil Procedure to protect his rights.
80. 341 So. 2d 1331 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 52 (La. 1977).
81. See also Singer Co./Singer Furniture Co. v. Willis, 435 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D.
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PRIVATE WORKS ACT
Louisiana National Bank v. Triple R Contractors, Inc. 2 is
the first supreme court case to interpret the adjacent lots privi-
lege under Revised Statutes 9:4816(A). The decision provides
guidelines for determining when the privilege attaches to adja-
cent lots and what factors should be considered in determining
if there is a "separate phase of. . .development. . . pursuant
to separate and distinct construction contracts. '" ' 3
In American Bank & Trust v. F & W Construction Co.,
Inc.8 a collateral mortgage was recorded but the "ne varietur"
note was not pledged. Work began and materials were fur-
nished; the "ne varietur" note was then pledged to the creditor.
The court held that a collateral mortgage cannot affect third
parties until both the mortgage is recorded and the "ne varie-
tur" note is pledged; because work began before the "ne varie-
tur" note was pledged, the materialman's lien outranked the
collateral mortgage.
Courshon v. TIL" apparently involved an ordinary mort-
gage to secure future advances, not a collateral mortgage. Be-
ginning with the premise that a mortgage to secure future ad-
vances ranks from the date of recordation, not from the date
funds were actually advanced,8" the court ruled that if recorda-
tion occurred prior to the time work began and materials were
furnished, the holder of the future advance mortgage out-
ranked the materialman regardless of the time the funds were
actually lent. Unfortunately, the court did not specify whether
the mortgage in question was a mortgage to secure future ad-
vances or a collateral mortgage. From the facts, it appeared to
La. 1977). A vendor's privilege on movable property applies only to sales completed in
Louisiana. If a sale is completed outside of Louisiana and the state in which the sale
was completed does not recognize the vendor's privilege, no vendor's privilege will be
granted in Louisiana. LA. R.S. 9:5353 has been amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 572, §
1, to provide a method for perfecting an out-of-state security interest on movables
brought into Louisiana.
82. 345 So. 2d 7 (La. 1977).
83. LA. R.S. 9:4816(A) (Supp. 1977).
84. 357 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1306 (La. 1978).
85. 344 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 So. 2d 1108 (La. 1977).
86. Thrift Funds Canal Inc. v. Foy, 261 La. 573, 260 So. 2d 628 (1972). Cf. Vetter,
supra note 34.
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have been a mortgage to secure future advances; but the court
applied Revised Statutes 9:4801(C),"7 which appears to be
applicable only to collateral mortgages. The phrase "and the
note delivered" in the statute seems to be an explicit reference
to a collateral mortgage, for only a collateral mortgage involves
delivery (pledge or "issuance") of the note paraphed for identi-
fication with the act of mortgage. In a mortgage to secure fu-
ture advances, there is no need to "deliver" the note because,
as it directly represents the debt being secured, it never leaves
the creditor's possession.18
Furthermore, even as applied to collateral mortgages, sec-
tion 4801(C) should not be read to give the collateral mortgagee
a superior ranking position if (1) the building contract has been
recorded," (2) labor has begun, or (3) materials have been fur-
nished prior to both the recordation of the collateral mortgage
and the pledge of the "ne varietur" note. Most practitioners
make it a policy not to record a mortgage if there is a contract
of record, or to require cancellation of the contract prior to
87. When a mortgage note has been executed by the owner of the immova-
ble for the purpose of securing advances to be made either simultaneously
therewith or in the future, whether such advances be for the payment of all or
part of the purchase price of the property, for commitment fees or any other type
of expenses incurred or to be incurred in connection with construction on the
property, and the mortgage has been recorded and the note delivered to the
lender before any work or labor has begun or material has been furnished, or
before the recordation of a building contract, the amount of the advances made
simultaneously therewith or thereafter shall be deemed secured by the mortgage
in precedence to and with priority over any of the claims had under the privi-
leges conferred by Sub-Section (A) of this section, except as stated Sub-Section
(D) hereof.
LA. R.S. 9:4801(C) (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
88. For sources on the distinction between a mortgage to secure future advances
and a collateral mortgage, see note 34, supra. Several old cases talk about "delivery"
of the note in an ordinary mortgage situation as supporting proof of acceptance of the
mortgage by the mortgagee. See, e.g., Citizens' Bank v. Ferry, 32 La. Ann. 310 (1880);
Ells v. Sims, 2 La. Ann. 251 (1847). It does not appear likely, however, that this is the
type of delivery to which Revised Statutes 9:4801(C) refers.
89. If a building contract is not recorded before the work is to commence, the
provisions of Revised Statutes 9:4802 have been violated. This means that not only
does the owner become personally liable to claimants under sections 4806 and 4812 of
the Act, but claimants can proceed under Revised Statutes 9:4812 because the contract
was not recorded "as and when required." Additionally, the general contractor loses
his privilege. Gulfco Fin. Co. of Marrero v. Malone, 230 So. 2d 269 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969), writ not considered, 255 La. 341, 230 So. 2d 835 (1970).
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recording the mortgage. It is a commonly held belief among
practitioners that if either (a) labor has begun or materials
have been furnished before the recordation of an ordinary mort-
gage or (b) the building contract has been recorded before re-
cordation of the ordinary mortgage, then materialmen may
outrank the ordinary mortgagee. No policy reason dictates that
the rule should differ for either future advance"0 or collateral"
mortgages; the act needs to be further clarified on this point.
Since its inception," the Private Works Act has suffered
from almost yearly amendment by the legislature. These an-
nual changes, in conjunction with rather prolix language, have
created both lacunae concerning procedures to be followed and
pitfalls for the unwary. For example, meshing the procedural
requirements for claiming the lien and the substantive recover-
ies allowed lien claimants in concursus proceedings invoked
under the Act is no simple task. Federal National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Clasim, Inc. 11 held that when a concursus proceed-
ing had been invoked under section 4804 of the Act, an answer
filed in the concursus action negated the requirement94 that the
lien claimant file a separate suit within a year after recording
his affidavit to claim the privilege. On the other hand, the
court also held that filing an answer in the concursus proceed-
ing did not vitiate the need to record a notice of lis pendens;95
unless the notice was timely filed, the privilege perempted.
The detail required in the notice of lis pendens was dis-
cussed in Ragsdale v. Hoover;" Paul E. Riviere, Inc. v. Univer-
90. In fact, in Hortman-Salmen Co., Inc. v. White, 168 La. 1057, 123 So. 711
(1929), the supreme court expressly refused to create a distinction in ranking between
an ordinary mortgage and a mortgage to secure future advances under the provisions
of the forerunner of Revised Statutes 9:4812. Cf. Courshon v. Mauroner-Craddock,
Inc., 219 So. 2d 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 253 La. 760-62, 219 So. 2d
778 (1969).
91. Except, as noted, that in a collateral mortgage, both recordation of the collat-
eral mortgage and pledge of the "ne varietur" note must occur to mark one's rank as
to third parties.
92. For the history of previous reincarnations of the Private Works Act, see H.
DAGGETT, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATrEL MORTGAGE 225-34 (1942).
93. 340 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1110, 1111
(La. 1977).
94. LA. R.S. 9:4802 (Supp. 1966 & 1977).
95. Id.
96. 353 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 So. 2d 263 (La. 1978).
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sal Excavators, Inc. 7 dealt with the requisite details for lien
affidavits. Both cases held that minor errors in these docu-
ments will not defeat the lien.
There continues to be a split in the jurisprudence on the
issue of subrogation under the Private Works Act. Two ques-
tions are involved: first, is a contractor or sub-contractor who
pays his laborers entitled to claim the laborers' privilege as to
the owner and unsecured creditors; second, is he entitled to the
rank of the laborers' privilege as to secured creditors.
The answer to the second question appears to be settled;
a sub-contractor cannot pay his laborers and be subrogated by
operation of law to the laborers' priority98 over other secured
creditors." On the other hand, there is no definitive answer to
the first question. The First Circuit appears to have held that
a materialman who pays his laborers is not entitled to any
privilege on the property for the amounts paid.10 In contrast,
the Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal' °1 have held
that a sub-contractor or labor supplier, while not subrogated to
the laborers' superior ranking, is entitled to a privilege on the
property over unsecured creditors up to the amount paid to the
laborers. The Louisiana State Law Institute currently is work-
ing on a restatement of the Private Works Act that, if adopted,
should clarify these uncertain areas.
97. 358 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
98. The basis of the laborer's priority is Revised Statutes 9:4801(D).
99. Pringle Associated Mort. Corp. v. Eanes, 208 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1968), aff'd, 254 La. 705, 226 So. 2d 502 (1969).
100. Hunt v. La Chere Maison, Inc., 316 So. 2d 850 (La. App; 1st Cir. 1975).
101. Ragsdale v. Hoover, 353 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
355 So. 2d 263 (La. 1978); City Bank and Trust Co. v. Caneco Constr. Inc., 341 So. 2d
1331 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 52 (La. 1977). See also American
Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. United States Service Corp., 430 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. La. 1977).
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